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 CUSTODIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 
CUSTOMER FUNDS 
Jerry W. Markham* 
If any one place his property with another for safe keeping, and there, 
either through thieves or robbers, his property and the property of the 
other man be lost, the owner of the house, through whose neglect the loss 
took place, shall compensate the owner for all that was given to him in 
charge. But the owner of the house shall try to follow up and recover his 
property, and take it away from the thief. 
 Code of Hammurabi (c. 1772 B.C.E.) 
INTRODUCTION 
A series of bankruptcies by large financial institutions in recent years 
resulted in massive shortages of customer funds. The first of those failures, 
Refco, Inc. (Refco), occurred in 2005 after the exposure of a massive fraud 
by its officers. 1  That debacle was followed in 2007 by the failure of 
Sentinel Management Group, Inc. (Sentinel), which had used several 
hundred million dollars of customer assets to leverage the firm’s trading 
position. 2  The failure of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (Lehman or 
Lehman Brothers) during the Financial Crisis in 2008 was the largest 
bankruptcy in U.S. history and resulted in extensive litigation over rights to 
customer funds held in custody here and abroad.3 The Lehman debacle was 
soon followed by the unraveling of Bernie Madoff’s massive Ponzi scheme, 
which led to billions of dollars of losses in customer funds.4 Only a few 
months later, U.S. authorities charged that R. Allen Stanford had been 
running another giant Ponzi scheme out of Antigua that involved $7 billion 
in customer funds.5 A shortage of some $1.2 billion in customer funds was 
discovered after MF Global Inc. (MF Global) declared bankruptcy in 
                                                                                                                 
 * Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law. The author has acted as 
a consultant and expert witness in several of the proceedings discussed herein. 
 1. See generally Refco: Rotten Yet Robust, ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 2005, at 86, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/5064953 (describing this failure). 
 2. See In re Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 689 F.3d 855, 857 (7th Cir. 2012) (describing this 
failure). 
 3.  Patrick Fitzgerald, Lehman Trustee Ends Citigroup Fight, WALL ST.  J., Nov. 19, 2012, at 
C3, available at http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10001424127887323852904578127202132976518.html. 
 4. See DIANA B. HENRIQUES, T HE WIZARD OF LIES: BERNIE MADOFF AND THE DEA TH OF 
T RUST 10 (2011).  
 5. Clifford Krauss, Jury Convicts Stanford in $7 Billion Ponzi Fraud, N.Y. T IMES, Mar. 7, 
2012, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/business/jury-convicts-stanford-in-
7-billion-ponzi-fraud.html. 
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October 2011.6 That highly publicized failure was followed by a massive 
fraud at Peregrine Financial Group Inc. (Peregrine or PFG), where the 
firm’s owner simply looted nearly $215 million in customer funds held in 
custody.7 
These shortfalls have raised widespread concerns over custodial 
arrangements for customer funds held at financial institutions. In Parts I–III, 
this Article describes custodial requirements for customer funds under the 
Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (the CEA),8 federal securities laws,9 and 
banking regulations.10 Part IV then addresses the gaps in those regulations 
that allowed losses of customer funds to occur, and Part V recounts 
regulators’ efforts to prevent future failures. In Parts VI and VII, this Article 
will also recommend the creation of a universal custody arrangement that 
can be more readily monitored and provide greater protection of customer 
funds. This proposal would require that each customer account be treated as 
a separate trust that would be ring-fenced from the losses of other 
customers all the way from deposit at a broker or other intermediary to the 
bank or clearinghouse where the funds are held in custody. Improper use of 
customer funds by intermediaries and custodians would be addressed by 
requiring a tri-party custodian arrangement, which would allow independent 
reporting of funds held in custody for each customer. 
I. CEA CUSTODIAL REQUIREMENTS 
A.   DOMESTIC FUTURES CUSTOMERS 
The CEA requires futures commission merchants (FCMs) to register 
with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the CFTC) and to 
comply with CFTC rules governing the treatment of customer funds.11 An 
FCM is the analogue in the futures industry to broker-dealers in the 
securities industry. An FCM accepts customer orders and funds for trading 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Report of the Trustee’s Investigation and Recommendations at 95–98, In re MF Global 
Inc., No. 11-2790 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2012) [hereinafter Trustee’s Investigation and 
Recommendations]. 
 7. Jacob Bunge, Peregrine Accounts to Be Transferred to Vision Financial, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
8, 2012, at C3, available at http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10000872396390444223104578040140301343094.html. 
 8. Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (Commodity Exchange Act), Pub. L. No. 74-675, 49 
Stat. 1491 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. (2012)).  
 9. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 
Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21). 
 10. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK: 
CUSTODY SERVICES (2002) [hereinafter COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK], available at 
http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/custodyservice.pdf 
(describing those arrangements). 
 11. See 7 U.S.C. § 6f(a). 
94 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 8 
in commodity futures and commodity options.12 FCM customers often have 
excess margin funds (excess funds) in their commodity futures and options 
accounts that are not needed to margin their open positions.13 Excess funds 
occur for many reasons, such as the closing of an open position, which frees 
up the funds that were used to margin that position.14 A favorable gain from 
variation margin can also create excess funds.15 
Section 4d(2) of the CEA requires that funds of FCM customers be 
separately accounted for and be held in specially segregated accounts.16 
This provision was intended to require that customer funds be held in a trust 
account.17 As Senator James Murray, the Senate sponsor of the CEA, noted 
in 1936, this requirement was needed because FCM customers were 
“rank[ed] only as general creditors. Surely they thought their margins were 
regarded as trust funds and would be handled with a reasonable degree of 
integrity.”18 This mandatory trust fund status was intended to stop the then-
common practice in the industry whereby futures “commission merchants 
receiving margin monies in excess of the amount required by the exchanges 
to be deposited use[d] these excess margin deposits as their own capital, for 
any purpose they [chose].”19 
The CFTC has explained that the CEA requirements for handling 
customer funds in the futures industry are that:  
[1] customer funds must be separately accounted for by the FCM, [2] must 
not be commingled with the FCM’s own funds, [3] must be held  for the 
benefit of customers, [4] must be available to the customer and the FCM 
[when held by a custodian] immediately upon demand, and [5] must be 
                                                                                                                 
 12. For a description of these contracts and their trading and the role of FCMs, see JERRY W. 
MARKHAM, T HE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES T RADING AND ITS REGULATION 204 (1986) 
[hereinafter MARKHAM, COMMODITY FU TURES T RADING]. Section 724(a) of the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank) also required funds of 
Cleared Swaps Customers that secure swaps to be segregated. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 724(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 
1682–84 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6d(f)).  
 13. MARKHAM, COMMODITY FUTURES T RADING, supra note 12, at  204–05. 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. 
 16. See 7 U.S.C. § 6d(a)(2). 
 17. FCMs were required by this provision to “treat their customers’ money as trust funds.” 
H.R. REP. NO. 73-1637, at 6 (1934). 
 18. 80 CONG. REC. 7858 (1936) (statement of Sen. James Murray) (stating that section 4d(2) 
“merely provides that the public’s money put up for margin shall in fact be treated as belonging to 
the customer, and held in trust. Who can object to this?”). 
 19. Id. As the CFTC noted in Dorn v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 21,253 (Oct. 6, 1981): 
 
The language of the statute and its legislative history indicate that Section 4d was designed 
for the broad purpose of protecting customers from having their money, securities or property 
appropriated by a futures commission merchant, or some other depository, without adequate 
legal basis, and the more specific purpose of ensuring the integrity of the futures market by 
preventing the use of customer funds to finance market transactions by a futures commission 
merchant for its own account or for other customers. 
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calculated so as to prevent the use of one customer’s funds to marg in or 
secure another customer’s position. 20 
Additionally, (6) customer funds may not be used to secure a loan of the 
FCM.21 
These requirements are implemented through a series of rules 
administered by the CFTC. CFTC Rule 1.20 imposes the basic requirement 
that customer funds be separately accounted for and segregated.22 That rule 
further requires that any bank receiving commodity customer funds must 
provide a written acknowledgement that the bank was informed that “the 
customer funds deposited therein are those of commodity or option 
customers and are being held in accordance with the provisions of the 
[CEA] and this part.”23 
The Commodity Exchange Authority, the predecessor to the CFTC, 
opined after the adoption of the segregation requirement in 1936 that a 
third-party depository of segregated customer funds of an FCM could have 
no claim against those funds. 24  To assure this result, the Commodity 
Exchange Authority required banks to acknowledge that customer assets 
would in fact be segregated from the accounts of the FCM.25 Banks acting 
in this depository capacity were required to waive any offset rights for 
credit extensions made to the FCM or anyone else. 26  That waiver 
requirement was subsequently rendered unnecessary when the CEA was 
amended in 1968 to apply its segregation requirements directly to banks and 
other depositories of FCM customer funds.27 
Rule 1.20 prohibits the commingling of customer funds with those of 
the FCM or any other person, except that customer funds may be 
commingled with those of other customers—a form of collective trust.28 
However, CFTC Rule 1.23 allows FCMs to keep their own funds in 
customer segregated accounts to serve as a cushion in the event of an 
unexpected shortfall.29 The FCM may also invest the customer funds held 
in segregation in securities specified in CFTC Rule 1.25, which includes 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See Deposit  of Customer Funds in an Offshore Depository, Interpretative Letter No. 88-14, 
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,295 (Aug. 1, 1988) (describing these requirements). 
 21.  Dorn, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,253, at *9. 
 22. 17 C.F.R. § 1.20(a) (2013). 
 23. Id.  
 24. Commodity Exch. Auth., Administrative Determination No. 12 (Nov. 30, 1936). 
 25.  Id.  
 26.  Id.  
 27. See Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 90-258, sec. 6, § 4d, 82 Stat. 26, 27–28 (1968) 
(codified as amen ded at 7 U.S.C. § 6 d(b) (2012)). The 1968 amendments sought “ to prohibit 
expressly customers’ funds from being used to offset liabilit ies of the futures commission 
merchants or otherwise bein g misappropriated.” S. REP. NO. 90-947, at 7 (1968), reprinted in 
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1673, 1679. 
 28. 17 C.F.R. § 1.20(a). 
 29. Id. § 1.23.  
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obligations of the U.S. government and of the states.30  At variance with 
traditional trust principles, CFTC Rule 1.29 allows FCMs to keep for 
themselves the interest or other return from such investments.31 
CFTC Rule 1.32 requires that FCMs make a computation of the amount 
required to be held in segregation as of the close of business each day.32 
That computation must be made by noon of the following day. 33 The CFTC 
requires that computation to be made by using the net liquidating value (the 
NLV) of all futures and options customers trading on domestic exchanges.34 
The NLV is computed by adding customer ledger balances, open trade 
equity, net option value, securities, and other property (excluding letters of 
credit), which is then grossed-up for any customer debit/deficit balances.35 
The ledger balance is computed by subtracting debits from credits to the 
account on the day of calculation.36 CFTC Rule 1.12(h) requires the FCM 
to notify the CFTC if funds and securities on deposit in segregated accounts 
are less than the requirement.37 
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 38  and CFTC part 190 rules 
promulgated under that statute 39  seek to give customer funds held in 
segregated accounts under section 4d of the CEA priority over the claims of 
creditors of the FCM. The House Report for this legislation stated that the 
relationship between a commodity broker and its customers “is not unlike 
the relationship between a stockbroker and his customers. Yet the current 
Bankruptcy Act provides no special protection for customers of commodity 
brokers as it does for stockbroker customers.”40 
                                                                                                                 
 30. 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.25–.26 (requiring such investments to be held in segregated accounts).  
 31. Id. § 1.29. See, e.g., Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(FCM could retain the interest from such investments); Marchese v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 
822 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1987) (same); Crabtree Invs., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith Inc., 577 F. Supp. 1466, 1473 (M.D. La. 1984), aff’d 738 F.2d 434 (5th Cir. 1984) (same). 
However, most sophisticated customers with bargaining power will demand at least a portion of 
such returns. See Craig v. Refco, Inc., 816 F.2d 347, 348 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussin g such 
arrangements). 
 32. 17 C.F.R. § 1.32.  
 33. Id.  
 34.  Interpretive Notice 9066 - NFA Financial Requirements Section 16: FCM Financial 
Practices and Excess Segregate Funds/Secured/Amount/Cleared Swaps Customer Collateral 
Disbursements, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfamanual/NFAManual.aspx 
?RuleID=9066&Section=9 (last modified July 1, 2013) [hereinafter Interpretive Notice 9066]. 
 35. NAT’L FU TURES ASS’N, MARGINS HANDBOOK 6 (1999), available at 
http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfa-compliance/publication-library/margins-handbook.pdf. The ledger 
balance calculation includes checks that have not yet cleared. Open trade equity is the unrealized 
gain or loss on open futures positions. See CFTC, FORM 1-FR-FCM INSTRUCTIONS 10-2 (2010) 
[hereinafter FORM 1-FR-FCM INSTRUCTIONS], available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups 
/public /@iointermediaries/documents/file/1fr-fcminstructions.pdf. Net option value is the 
unrealized gain or loss on options positions. Id.  
 36.  FORM 1-FR-FCM INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 35, at  5-1. 
 37. 17 C.F.R. § 1.12(h). 
 38. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. 
 39. 17 C.F.R. pt. 190. 
 40. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 269 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6227. 
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As described below, customers of broker-dealers are covered by an 
account insurance scheme administered by the Securities Investor 
Protection Corporation (SIPC) that provides up to $500,000 in insurance in 
the event of a broker-dealer’s bankruptcy that results in a shortage of 
customer funds.41 No such insurance is available under the CEA for FCM 
customers. 
The CFTC’s so-called Part 190 rules govern the treatment of customer 
funds and securities when a FCM declares bankruptcy.42 In proposing the 
Part 190 Rules, the CFTC stated: 
The proposed regulations are intended to implement these customer and 
market protections and in this regard to achieve several specific purposes, 
including: (1) To promote equitable treatment of customers; (2) to enhance 
certainty as to the effects of a bankruptcy distribution; (3) to limit the 
period during which the bankrupt estate is at risk from fluctuations in 
value of the commodity contracts and other property contained therein; (4) 
to permit certain transactions which may be effected between customers 
without the intervention of the debtor to take place outside the bankrupt 
estate; (5) to maximize recovery in kind; and (6) to prov ide an 
understandable and workable method for operating the estate pending 
liquidation.43 
An important element of those rules allows for the immediate transfer 
of open customer futures and options positions to another solvent FCM.44 
That ability is often critical in fast-moving markets where customers can 
experience large losses if they do not have control over their accounts.45 
Identifiable customer property may also be transferred.46 Customer losses 
will be measured by the shortfall in the FCM’s segregated account.47 
B.  CUSTOMERS TRADING ON FOREIGN COMMODITY EXCHANGES 
The CFTC created a separate regime for the protection of domestic 
customers trading on foreign exchanges through an FCM. This action was 
taken when an extensive series of problems with such trading arose after the 
creation of the CFTC.48 The CFTC initially acted by adopting an anti-fraud 
                                                                                                                 
 41. See infra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 42. 17 C.F.R. pt. 190. 
 43. Proposed Rules Implementing the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 46 Fed. Reg. 57,535–
36 (proposed Nov. 24, 1981) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 190) [hereinafter CFTC Proposed 
Rules, Bankruptcy Reform Act]. 
 44. See 17 C.F.R. § 190.06(e). 
 45. See Andrea M. Corcoran & Susan C. Ervin, Maintenance of Market Strategies in Futures 
Broker Insolvencies: Futures Position Transfers from Troubled Firms, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV.  
849, 877 (1987) (describing these transfer arrangements). 
 46.  See id. at  878. 
 47.  Id. at  879. 
 48.  See Foreign Options and Foreign Futures Transactions, 51 Fed. Reg. 12,104 (proposed 
Apr. 8, 1986) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 30). 
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rule for foreign futures transactions.49 There was concern, however, as to 
whether the CFTC had authority to take such action.50 Congress, therefore, 
amended the CEA in 1982 to clarify that authority.51 That amendment also 
granted the CFTC authority broadly to regulate foreign futures trading, 
including requirements for minimal financial standards, book and record 
keeping requirements, and the “safeguarding of customer funds.”52 
To implement that authority, the CFTC adopted Rule 30.7, which 
imposed limited custody requirements for domestic customers trading on 
foreign commodity exchanges.53  This rule required FCMs to set aside a 
“Secured Amount” as protection for the funds of such customers.54 Like 
those governed by section 4d of the CEA, funds of customers trading 
foreign futures must be placed in a separate account identified as a secured 
amount account and commingling of FCM funds is prohibited, except to the 
extent the FCM places funds in the Secured Amount account to serve as a 
cushion against shortfalls.55 However, unlike section 4d, CFTC Rule 30.7 
was not intended to make those accounts trust funds where all of the Rule 
30.7 customers’ excess funds would be held.56 
The FCM must set aside the Secured Amount only as a form of security 
or deposit, somewhat akin to a margin requirement where only a portion of 
the contract price is set aside as security for performance.57 The CFTC staff 
has thus noted that the funds in a Secured Amount account are a “security 
deposit only;” it “is not customer money per se as are segregated funds;” it 
“is ‘security’ and not a ‘trust’ of funds explicitly denominated as belonging 
to customers.”58 Moreover, until recently, the FCM could invest those funds 
unconstrained by the investment restrictions for segregated funds of 
domestic customers under CFTC Rule 1.25.59 
The amount required to be set aside in Secured Amount accounts could 
be considerably less than that required to be segregated for customers 
trading on domestic exchanges. The CFTC defined the secured amount in 
                                                                                                                 
 49. 17 C.F.R. § 30.9. 
 50.  See id. 
 51. This background is described in Foreign Options and Foreign Futures Transactions, 51 
Fed. Reg. at 12,104. 
 52. Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub L. No. 97-444, sec. 204, § 4, 96 Stat. 2294, 2299 
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6 (2012)) (adding a new section 4(b) to the CEA). 
 53. 17 C.F.R. § 30.7. 
 54.  Id. § 30.7(a). 
 55. Id. § 30.7(a), (d). 
 56.  Id. 
 57. See Jerry W. Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin in the Commodity Futures 
Industry—History and Theory, 64 T EMP. L. REV. 59, 97 (1991) (describing the role of margin). 
 58. Compliance and Operational Questions and Answers Concerning the Foreign Futures and 
Options Rule, Advisory Letter No. 87-4, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23,975 (Nov. 24, 1987). 
 59. See Investment of Customer Funds an d Funds Held in an Account for Foreign Futures an d 
Foreign Options Transactions, 76 Fed. Reg. 78,776, 78,776 (Dec. 19, 2011) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 1, 30) [hereinafter Investment of Customer Funds] (amending CFTC Rules to subject 
Secured Amount accounts to CFTC Rule 1.25). 
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Rule 1.3 to be money, securities, and property required by a FCM to 
margin, guarantee, or secure open foreign futures contracts, plus or minus 
any unrealized gain or loss on foreign futures or options contracts and 
option premiums.60 This formula in Rule 1.3 varied from the NLV’s for the 
section 4d segregation computation in that customer securities or excess 
funds need not be included in the calculation. 61 As a result, the Secured 
Amount computed under Rule 1.3 would be less than the figure computed 
by the NLV method. 62  Nevertheless, for reasons of convenience, most 
FCMs used the NLV method to meet their Rule 30.7 requirements.63 For 
the most part, only the larger firms had sufficient customers to justify the 
expense of a separate Rule 1.3 calculation.64 
The CFTC complicated the situation by allowing those firms making a 
Rule 1.3 calculation to use the lesser of the Rule 1.3 calculation or of a 
NLV calculation on an account-by-account basis.65 Further complexity was 
added by another formula to be used where the Secured Amount account 
included funds of foreign customers trading on foreign exchanges.66 Again, 
the lesser of the Rule 1.33 calculation, NLV, or foreign person calculation 
could be used on an account-by-account basis.67 These calculations were 
referred to as the “Alternative Method.”68 
II. FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS CUSTODY REQUIREMENTS 
A. BROKER-DEALER CUSTODY REQUIREMENTS 
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) adopted Rule  
15c3-3 to require broker-dealers to account for customer funds and 
                                                                                                                 
 60. 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(p)(1). 
 61.  Enhancing Protections Afforded Customers and Customer Funds Held by Futures 
Commission Merchants and Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 77 Fed. Reg. 67,866, 67,867 
(proposed Nov. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3, 22, 30, 140) [hereinafter CFTC 
Proposed Rules, Enhancing Protections]. 
 62. As the CFTC has noted: 
[Section] 30.7 requires an FCM to maintain in separate accounts an amount of funds only 
sufficient to cover the margin required on open foreign futures contracts, plus or minus any 
unrealized gains or losses on such open positions, plus any funds representing premiums 
payable or received on foreign options (including any additional funds necessary to secure 
such options, plus or minus any unrealized gains or losses on such options) (i.e., the 
“Alternative Method”). Thus, under the Part 30 Alternative Method an FCM is not required 
to maintain a sufficient amount of funds in such separate accounts to pay the full account 
balances of all of its foreign futures or foreign options customers at all t imes. 
Id.  
 63. JOINT AUDIT COMM., FOREIGN FUTURES AND OPTIONS GUIDE 5–6 (2001), available at 
http://www.wjammer.com/jac/ForeignFuturesandOptionsGuide-Dec%202001.pdf. 
 64. CFTC Proposed Rules, Enhancing Protections, supra note 61, at 172. 
 65. FORM 1-FR-FCM INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 35, at 12-2.  
 66.  Id. at 5-2.  
 67. Id. at 12-2.   
 68. JOINT AUDIT COMM., supra note 63, at 5–6.  
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securities and hold them in specially designated accounts. 69  This 
requirement “was designed to assure that customers’ funds (as well as 
securities) held by broker-dealers are protected against broker-dealer misuse 
or insolvency.” 70 SEC Rule 15c3-3 is generally referred to as the SEC’s 
“Customer Protection Rule.”71 It was adopted in the wake of the so-called 
“Paper Work Crisis” that occurred at the end of the 1960s.72 
Over 100 New York Stock Exchange firms failed during that crisis as a 
result of their inability to deal with increased trading volumes. 73  Many 
brokerage firms lost control of their customer securities, and lost and stolen 
securities were widespread problems.74 Concern was also raised that broker 
dealers were using customer free credit balances for their own purposes, 
and those securities and funds were lost when their broker-dealer failed.75 
Congress responded to these problems by enacting the Securities Investor 
Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA), which directed the SEC to adopt rules 
designed to protect customer funds in the custody of registered broker-
dealers.76 
SIPA also created an insurance scheme that provided account insurance 
of up to $100,000 per customer (later increased to $500,000, including 
$100,000 of customer cash) for losses caused by their broker-dealer’s 
insolvency—it does not insure against investment losses.77 That insurance 
fund is administered by SIPC, a private non-profit corporation that is 
funded by assessments on broker-dealers.78 
                                                                                                                 
 69. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3 (2013). 
 70. Customer Protection Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 21,865, 1985 WL 548164 (Mar. 19, 
1985) [hereinafter Customer Protection Release]. 
 71.  17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3. 
 72.  2 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM J.P. 
MORGAN TO THE INSTITU TIONAL INVESTOR (1900–1970) 364–65 (2002) [hereinafter 2 
MARKHAM, FINANCIAL HISTORY]. 
 73.  Id. at  364.  
 74. See id. (describing the Paper Work Crisis). 
 75. See generally HURD BARUCH, WALL STREET SECURITY RISK (1971) (criticizing these 
practices). 
 76. Security Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)). As the Supreme Court noted: 
Following a period of great expansion in the 1960’s, the securities industry experienced a 
business contraction that led to the failure or instability of a significant number of brokerage 
firms. Customers of failed firms found their cash and securities on deposit  either dissipated 
or tied up in lengthy bankruptcy proceedings. In addition to its disastrous effects on customer 
assets and investor confidence, this situation also threatened a “domino effect” involving 
otherwise solvent brokers that had substantial open transactions with firms that failed. 
Congress enacted the SIPA to arrest this process, restore investor confidence in the capital 
markets, and upgrade the financial responsibility requirements for registered brokers and 
dealers. 
Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 415 (1975). 
 77.  2 MARKHAM, FINANCIAL HISTORY, supra note 72, at  364–65. 
 78.  See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 261–62 (1992). 
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In the event of a failure of a covered broker-dealer, SIPC is authorized 
to seek its liquidation by a court-appointed trustee.79 The claims of general 
creditors are subordinated to the claims of the broker-dealer’s customers.80 
The trustee will return all securities held in the names of specific customers, 
and it then pools remaining securities for a pro rata distribution to 
customers.81 In the event of a shortfall, SIPC will cover the loss up to the 
$500,000/$100,000 limits.82 
The Customer Protection Rule includes a requirement that broker-
dealers maintain special accounts “in the nature of a trust fund through 
which a broker-dealer must effectuate all transactions with regard to all 
‘funds carried for the account of any customer.’” 83  SEC Rule 15c3-3 
requires that broker-dealers maintain at a bank a “‘Special Reserve Bank 
Account for the Exclusive Benefit of Customers’ (‘Reserve Bank Account’) 
and deposit in this account its reserve requirement as computed in 
accordance with the Formula for Determination of Reserve Requirement 
For Brokers and Dealers (‘Reserve Formula’).”84 
The Reserve Formula is a complex one that totals the aggregate 
customer credits and debits with the broker-dealer.85  The amount of any 
excess credits must then be made to the Reserve Bank Account. 86 
Generally, the Reserve Formula must be completed by Tuesday of each 
week as of close of business at the end of the preceding week: usually 
Friday. 87 “In addition, before making a withdrawal from the Reserve Bank 
Account, a broker-dealer must make a computation which shows that after 
the withdrawal there is an amount remaining in the Reserve Bank Account 
at least equal to that required to be on deposit.”88 As the Eleventh Circuit 
has noted: 
The specifics of the Reserve Formula are fairly arcane, but its operation is 
straightforward. On a weekly basis, firms must balance customer credits 
against customer debits. 17 C.F.R. §  240.15c3-3(e)(3). Subject to some 
adjustments, the Rule requires that firms hold an amount equal to the 
excess of credits over debits in the Reserve Account. 17 C.F.R.  
§ 240.15c3-3a. As defined by the regulations, “customer credits” captures 
the amount the firm owes its customers while “customer debits” refers to 
                                                                                                                 
 79.  See id. at  261.  
 80.  See id. at  261 n.1.  
 81.  See id. at 261.  
 82. See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 261–62 & n.2 (1992) (describing SIPC insurance). 
 83. Reserves and Related Measures Respecting the Financial Responsibility of Brokers and 
Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 9388, 1971 WL 126121, at *2 (Nov. 8, 1971); see also 17 
C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3 (2013). 
 84. Customer Protection Release, supra note 70, at *2. 
 85.  SEC v. Goble, 682 F.3d 934, 940 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(e)(3)). 
 86. Goble, 682 F.3d at 940; Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules for Broker-
Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 55,431, 2007 WL 737662, at  *6 (Mar. 9, 2007). 
 87. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(e)(3). 
 88. Customer Protection Release, supra note 70. 
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amounts the customers owe the firm. If, after the firm makes the reserve 
computation, it discovers that the Reserve Account balance is higher than 
the amount required by the Reserve Formula, the firm may make a 
withdrawal from the Reserve Account. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(g).89 
On July 31, 2013, the SEC adopted rule changes that require broker-
dealers having custody of customer assets to file a Compliance Report with 
the SEC to verify they are properly protecting those assets and periodically 
sending account statements to customers. 90  Such broker-dealers must 
engage an independent public accountant to examine the broker-dealer’s 
compliance report. 91  Further, broker-dealers must file a new, quarterly 
Form Custody report with the SEC that describes the broker-dealers’ 
custodial arrangements. 92  Broker-dealers must also allow SEC staff to 
examine the work papers of their accountants and to interview those 
accountants.93 
B.  INVESTMENT ADVISER CUSTODY REQUIREMENTS 
The SEC has adopted custody requirements for the funds of clients of 
investment advisers under the Investments Advisers Act of 1940. 94  An 
investment adviser is a fiduciary to its customers.95 In order to assure that 
investment advisers met their fiduciary duties, the SEC adopted a custody 
requirement for client funds (the IA Custody Rule).96 It imposes strict and 
robust custody requirements for customer assets held by registered 
investment advisers. 
The IA Custody Rule seeks to impose protections for the custody of 
investment adviser funds that are comparable to those available for other 
statutory trust funds.97  The IA Custody Rule thus seeks to “enhance the 
protections afforded to advisory clients’ assets, harmonize the rule with 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Goble, 682 F.3d at 940–41. 
 90.  Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rules to Increase Protections for Investors with Assets 
Being Held by Broker-Dealers (July 31, 2013) [hereinafter SEC Press Release], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539740621#.Ugo6rBYqhGA. 
 91.  Id.  
 92.  Id.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id.  
 95. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Investment Advisers Act as congressional 
recognition of the fact that investment advisers are fiduciaries for their customers. SEC v. Capital 
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963) (quoting 2 LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES 
REGULATION 1412 (2d ed. 1961) (“The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 thus reflects a 
congressional recognition ‘of the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment advisory relationship  
. . . .’”); Mones v. Mones, 169 B.R. 246, 256 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1994) (“[T]he Investment Advisers 
Act gives rise to a trust that imposes a fiduciary capacity. . . .”). 
 96. SEC Press Release, supra note 90; see 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2 (2013). 
 97. See generally U.S. GO V’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INVESTMENT ADVISERS: 
REQUIREMENTS AND COSTS ASSOCIA TED WITH THE CUSTODY RULE (2013), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/655754.pdf (describing the IA Custody Rule). 
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current custodial practices, and clarify circumstances under which advisers 
have custody.”98 
The IA Custody Rule was designed to require “an investment adviser 
who has custody of funds or securities of any client to maintain them in 
such a way that they will be insulated from and not be jeopardized by 
financial reverses, including insolvency, of the investment adviser.”99 The 
IA Custody Rule requires “investment advisers who have custody or 
possession of funds or securities of clients to segregate the securities and to 
hold them in safekeeping and to set up a separate trust account in a bank for 
funds belonging to each client.” 100  Alternatively, customer funds can be 
held in a collective account in the name of the investment adviser as agent 
or trustee for the clients. 101  The IA Custody Rule does not permit an 
investment adviser to route proprietary and customer assets through the 
same clearing and custodial accounts held with a bank.102 
The IA Custody Rule requires investment advisers to maintain 
customer assets with “qualified custodians,” which “include the types of 
financial institutions that clients and advisers customarily turn to for 
custodial services. These include banks and savings associations and 
registered broker-dealers.”103 The IA Custody Rule requires the qualified 
custodian to hold customer funds or securities in an account, either under 
the client’s name or under the adviser’s name as agent, or as trustee for its 
clients.104 
The IA Custody Rule requires that investment adviser customers be 
given periodic reports by the qualified custodian of the amounts held in 
segregation. 105  Alternatively, the investment adviser may make such 
reports, but in such a case the accounts of the investment adviser that 
contain customer funds must be verified by an independent public 
accountant annually through a surprise audit. 106  A report on that 
examination must be filed with the SEC.107 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers 
Act Release No. 2176, 68 Fed. Reg. 56,692, 56,692 (Oct. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Custody of Funds 
Release]. 
 99. Custody or Possession of Funds or Securities of Clients, Investment Advisers Act Release 
No. 123, 27 Fed. Reg. 2149, 2149 (Mar. 16, 1962) [hereinafter Custody or Possession Release]. 
 100.  Custody or Possession Release, supra note 99, at 2149. 
 101. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(a)(1)(ii). 
 102.  SEC v. Slocum, Gordon, & Co., 334 F. Supp.2d 144, 178 (D.R.I. 2004); Custody of Funds 
Release, supra note 98, at 56,693. 
 103. Custody of Funds Release, supra note 98, at 56,693–94 (footnotes omitted). 
 104. See id. at 56,692–93 (discussing this requirement). 
 105.  17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(a)(3). 
 106.  Id. § 275.206(4)-2(a)(4). 
 107. Id. 
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C.  INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT CUSTODY REQUIREMENTS 
The IA Custody Rule108 exempts from its reach investment advisers to 
investment companies registered with the SEC under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 (the IC Act).109 The IA Custody Rule is unneeded for 
those exempted advisers because the SEC has adopted custodial 
requirements for customer funds and securities held by mutual funds and 
other registered investment companies under the IC Act.110 
For example, SEC Rule 17f-1 prohibits registered management 
investment companies from placing securities or other investments in the 
custody of a member of a national security exchange unless there is a 
written agreement in place governing that custody. 111 That agreement must 
provide that the securities held in custody must be individually identified, 
marked, and segregated from the securities and investments of other 
persons.112 The securities segregated under Rule 17f-1 may not be subject 
to any lien or charge of any kind by the custodian. 113  The securities 
investments must also be verified by actual examination periodically and 
must be subject to inspection by the SEC staff.114 
SEC Rule 17f-2 imposes requirements on investment companies that 
deposit securities or other assets with a bank to be held in custody. 115 The 
investments deposited at such custodians must be able to be withdrawn 
upon demand by the investment company.116 Investments deposited at the 
bank custodian must be kept physically separate and segregated at all times 
from the assets of other persons.117 This rule also imposes restrictions on 
the persons who may withdraw securities from segregation. In addition, the 
existence of the securities must be verified at least three times each year 
through actual examination by an independent public accountant.118 Two of 
those inspection dates must be selected by the accountant.119 
SEC Rule 17f-3 prohibits free cash accounts held at a bank by the 
investment company except for petty cash in an amount not to exceed 
$500. 120 SEC Rule 17f-4 imposes requirements on investment companies 
that deposit fund assets with a securities depository or clearing 
                                                                                                                 
 108. Id. § 275.206(4)-2(b)(5).  
 109. See Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2012)).  
 110. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.17f-1 to -7. 
 111. Id. § 270.17f-1(a).  
 112.  Id. § 270.17f-1(b)(1). 
 113.  Id. § 270.17f-1(b)(3). 
 114. Id. § 270.17f-1(b)(4).  
 115. Id. § 270.17f-2. 
 116.  Id. § 270.17f-2(a). 
 117. Id. § 270.17f-1(b)(1). 
 118.  See id. § 270.17f-1(b)(4). 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. § 270.17f-3. 
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organization. 121 In order to be eligible to be a custodian, those depositories, 
and any intermediate custodian, must be obligated to exercise due care in 
accordance with reasonable commercial standards in maintaining the assets 
held in custody.122 SEC Rule 17f-5 imposes restrictions on the custody of 
funds held outside the United States,123 and Rule 17f-7 regulates the deposit 
of funds with foreign securities depositories.124 
III. BANK CUSTODY REQUIREMENTS 
A. IN GENERAL 
General banking practices have long required funds placed on “special 
deposit” by one party for the benefit of others to be segregated and not used 
for securing the debts of the depositing party.125 “A contract for a special 
deposit is not required to be in any particular form; it being a matter of 
intention and understanding of the parties.”126 All that is required is notice 
to the bank of the special nature of the deposits: 
A bank has knowledge of a special purpose account if the depositor labels 
the account in such a way that it is clear that the account is a special 
account. The bank also has knowledge of a special purpose account if the 
depositor and the bank have entered into an agreement giving the bank 
notice of the special purpose of the account. A special purpose account 
defeats a bank’s right to setoff because a third party who is not a debtor of 
the bank has an interest in the account. Since a party other than the bank’s 
debtor has an interest in the funds on deposit in a special account, the bank 
may  not exercise its right to setoff the property not belonging to the 
debtor.127 
Notice of a special deposit thus has important consequences for a bank. 
“It has universally been held that knowledge upon the part of a bank that 
deposits made by a debtor in his own name belong to a third person 
                                                                                                                 
 121. Id. § 270.17f-4. 
 122. Id.  
 123. Id. § 270.17f-5. 
 124. Id. § 270.17f-7. 
 125.  5B MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING § 331, at 547 (2002). 
 126. Id. (citing Bryan v. Coconut Grove Bank & Trust Co., 132 So. 481 (Fla. 1931); Fogg v. 
Tyler, 82 A. 1008 (Me. 1912).  
 127.  S. Perry Thomas, Jr., Comment, Bank’s Right of Setoff in Virginia, 41 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1603, 1619 (1984) (footnotes omitted); see also Union Stock-Yards Nat’l Bank v. Gillespie, 
137 U.S. 411, 422–23 (1890) (“The circumstances surrounding the deposits, and the relations 
between the depositor and the bank, were such as to impart notice to the bank that the beneficial 
ownership was o utside of the legal t it le. With that notice, it  had no right to appropriate the 
deposits to pay the obligations of the depositor to the bank . . . .”); Cent. Nat’l Bank v. Conn. Mut. 
Life Ins. Co., 104 U.S. 54, 63–64 (1881) (discussin g special deposits); Cassedy v. Johnstown 
Bank, 286 N.Y.S. 202, 205 (App. Div. 1936). 
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absolutely precludes the bank from applying such funds to the individual 
indebtedness of the depositor to it.”128  
There is general agreement that if a person who has a claim against the 
trustee in his individual capacity accepts from the debtor, in payment of 
the debt, or as security therefor, property which the creditor knows or 
should know is trust property, the recipient takes part in a breach of the 
fiduciary obligation.129 
B. BANKING REGULATION 
Banks may act as trustees for customer assets. Those activities are 
governed by state trust laws but are overseen by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (the OCC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (the FDIC).130 The FDIC thus requires its consent before an 
insured bank may exercise trust powers; it examines bank trust activities 
and may sanction banks that engage in fiduciary breaches.131 It also insures 
trust accounts as bank deposits.132 
OCC Regulation 9 governs fiduciary activities of national banks.133 
Such fiduciary activities include national banks that act as trustees.134 
Regulators distinguish between banks in their role as trustees and as a 
deposit institution. The relationship between the beneficiaries of a trust and 
the trustee is a fiduciary relationship. 135  That is not the case for bank 
depositors.136 A bank may invest funds deposited by customers but may not 
do so for trust beneficiaries, except for their benefit.137 This means, among 
other things, national banks must keep fiduciary assets separate from all 
other accounts. 138  However, individual trust accounts may be held 
collectively with other trust accounts.139 
Large banks provide custodial services for other institutions, which 
involve the safekeeping of funds as collateral for a loan, credit exposure, or 
other reasons. “Banks provide custody services to a variety of customers, 
                                                                                                                 
 128. B. C. Ricketts, Annotation, Bank’s Right to Apply Third Person’s Funds, Deposited in 
Debtor’s Name, on Debtor’s Obligation, 8 A.L.R.3d 235, 239 (1966). 
 129. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., BOGERT’S T RUSTS AND T RUSTEES § 904 (3d ed. 
2007) (footnotes omitted). 
 130.  FDIC, T RUST E XAMINATION MANUAL § 10.D.3 (2009) [hereinafter T RUST EXAMINATION 
MANUAL], available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/trustmanual/.  
 131.  Id. § 10.B.  
 132. Id. § 10.A–.B.3, .G.7. 
 133. 12 C.F.R. pt. 9 (2013). 
 134. Id. § 9.2.  
 135.  Id.  
 136.  AM. BANKERS ASS’N, T RUST OPERATIONS 360 (1992). 
 137. Id.  
 138. 12 C.F.R. § 9.13 (2012). 
 139. Id. § 9.18; see Jerry W. Markham, Mutual Fund Scandals—A Comparative Analysis of the 
Role of Corporate Governance in the Regulation of Collective Investments, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J.  
67, 121–22 (2006) [hereinafter Markham, Mutual Fund Scandals] (describing development of 
bank collective trust funds). 
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including mutual funds and investment managers, retirement plans, bank 
fiduciary and agency accounts, bank marketable securities accounts, 
insurance companies, corporations, endowments and foundations, and 
private banking clients.”140 The OCC has noted: 
National banks’ custody activities developed from providing safekeeping 
and settlement services to customers for a fee, and historically are viewed 
as permissible incidental [banking] act ivities . . . and often are in 
conjunction with the delivery  of fiduciary  services. A custody relat ionship 
is a contractual arrangement, and the services performed  for customers 
vary. Services traditionally provided include the settlement, safekeeping, 
and reporting of customers’ marketable securities and cash. A custodian 
also may invest cash balances as directed, collect income, process 
corporate actions, price securities positions, and provide recordkeeping 
services. As custody services are contractual in  nature, a bank must ensure 
compliance with the provisions of all applicable agreements. The custody 
industry has grown significantly in recent years, and now global 
custodians control trillions of dollars in assets in offices around the 
world.141 
“Services provided by a bank custodian are typically the settlement, 
safekeeping, and reporting of customers’ marketable securities and cash.”142 
“A custodian providing core domestic custody services typically settles 
trades, invests cash balances as directed, collects income, processes 
corporate actions, prices securities positions, and provides recordkeeping 
and reporting services.” 143  Custodians may provide securities lending 
services that allow them to earn fees from the lending of their securities.144 
Custodians may also conduct daily sweeps of customer accounts and invest 
excess cash.145  Global custodians provide other services such as cross-
border settlements and foreign exchange transactions.146 
The concept of safekeeping of customer funds held in segregated 
accounts is well recognized by banking regulators.147 The OCC has thus 
noted that the term “segregation” has been defined as the “[o]ptional or 
compulsory separation of a participant’s own securities from those held on 
                                                                                                                 
 140. COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at  1. 
 141. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Adm’r of Nat’l Banks, Interpretive Letter No. 
1078, at 3 (2007) [hereinafter Comptroller Interpretive Letter No. 1078] (citations and footnotes 
omitted), available at http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-and-precedents/may07/int1078 
.pdf. 
 142. COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at  1. 
 143. Id. at  2.  
 144. Id.   
 145. MONTY P. GREGOR, T RUST OPERATIONS 25–26 (2000). 
 146.  See COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 2 (acknowledging that global 
custodians perform typical services such as settling trades and executing foreign exchange 
transactions). 
 147.  See, e.g., id. at  15.  
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behalf of its customers.” 148  The OCC has opined, however, that “[a] 
custodian is not a trustee, and generally is not subject to the strict fiduciary 
standards that govern the relationship between a trustee and beneficiary.”149 
The OCC has stated that “a custodian may perform functions that are 
fiduciary in nature,” but the OCC appears to limit such a role to those 
instances where the bank is exercising discretion over the trading of an 
account or providing investment advice.150 This raises an issue: is the bank 
acting as a “trustee” when it holds customer assets in segregation under the 
CEA or federal securities laws? In that regard, the CEA does apply directly 
to custodians of excess customer funds. 151  There is no corresponding 
requirement in the federal securities laws, but the SEC views such 
arrangements to be trust accounts.152 
The OCC has also pointed out that “[c]ustody services are contractual 
in nature, and a bank must ensure compliance with the provisions of all 
applicable agreements.”153 The federal securities laws, at the least, require 
the custodian bank to recognize contractually the fact that funds held under 
SEC Rule 15c3-3 are to be kept in segregated accounts. 154  Further, the 
custodian bank must “ensure that assets of each custody account are kept 
separate from the assets of the custodian and maintained under joint 
control.” 155  The recordkeeping by the custodian bank must also comply 
with applicable laws.156 
The interrelated nature of bank custodian roles and SEC segregation 
requirements is evidenced by the fact that banks may use SEC-regulated 
broker-dealers as custodians of fiduciary assets, and those funds will be 
protected by SEC Rule 15c3-3. 157 Conversely, as described above, banks 
are designated as qualified custodians under CFTC and SEC segregation 
requirements. 
IV. CUSTODIAL FAILURES 
A. REFCO’S FAILURE 
The revelation of a massive fraud at Refco in October 2005 stunned the 
financial community. 158  That firm had made a successful initial public 
                                                                                                                 
 148. Id. at 84.  
 149. Comptroller Interpretive Letter No. 1078, supra note 141, at 3 n.8. 
 150. COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at  11; Comptroller Interpretive Letter No. 
1078, supra note 141, at 3 n.8 (citations omitted). 
 151. See 7 U.S.C. § 6d(b) (2012). 
 152. See Custody or Possession Release, supra note 99. 
 153. COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 4. 
 154.  Id. at 2 n.2; 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(b)(4)(i)(D)(iii) (2013). 
 155. COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 15.  
 156. Id. at  21.  
 157. See T RUST EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 132, § 10.F.1.a.1.b.1. 
 158.  See Capital Mgmt. Select Fund Ltd. v. Bennett, 680 F.3d 214, 223 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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offering of its stock only a few months before its bankruptcy. 159  Refco 
failed after it announced a previously undisclosed loss from uncollectible 
receivables in the amount of $430 million and advised that investors could 
not rely upon its financial statements.160 The uncollectible receivables had 
arisen from customer losses in the late 1990s, which eventually reached 
some $1 billion. 161 Refco hid those losses on its books through an elaborate 
“round robin” loan scheme that took the receivable off Refco’s book at the 
end of each accounting period and restored it immediately afterwards.162 
This scheme was carried out over a period of several years by two Refco 
chief executive officers, both of whom were sentenced to long prison 
terms.163 
Refco was the parent company of Refco, LLC, the largest independent 
futures commission merchant in the United States. 164  After Refco 
announced its previously undisclosed account receivable loss, customers at 
Refco’s affiliates began seeking to withdraw their funds, resulting in a 
“[p]roverbial ‘run on the bank’” that Refco sought to stop by declaring a 
fifteen-day moratorium on withdrawals. 165  However, Refco declared 
bankruptcy only a few days later.166 The customer accounts at Refco, LLC 
                                                                                                                 
 159.  Id.  
 160.  Id.  
 161.  Id.  
 162. See id. at  223 (describing this scheme). The Refco bankruptcy examiner described these 
transactions as follows: 
The Round Trip Loans were two short term loans of several weeks duration that spanned the 
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Final Report of Examiner at 4, In re Refco Inc., No. 05-60006 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2007). 
 163. Ameet Sachdev, Refco Inc.: Former Mayer Brown Partner Joseph Collins Sentenced to 7 
Years in Prison, CHI. T RIB., Jan. 15, 2010, at C23, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com 
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 164.  Refco had previously settled a case with the CFTC over its failure to properly segregate 
customer funds. The CFTC charged in that case that Refco removed customer funds from 
segregation each day and used those funds to pay down its bank loans. Refco deposited a check 
from an affiliate to cover the amounts required to be segregated, but the bank account of the 
affiliate had insufficient funds to cover the checks. See Refco, Inc., CTFC Docket 95-2, 1994 
CTFC LEXIS 348, at *5 (Dec. 20, 1994) [hereinafter Refco, Inc.]. 
 165. Capital Mgmt. Select Fund Ltd. v. Bennett, 680 F.3d 214, 223 (2d Cir. 2012).  
 166. Id.  
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were held in segregation under the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936.167 
Those accounts were quickly auctioned off to Man Group for $323 million 
and were transferred in bulk to a Man Group affiliate, Man Financial.168 
That transfer was accomplished without significant loss to Refco, LLC 
customers.169 
Customers at another Refco affiliate were not so fortunate. One of 
Refco’s affiliates was Refco Capital Markets, Ltd., a Bermuda-chartered 
securities and foreign exchange broker that traded over-the-counter 
derivatives for clients. 170  RCM’s operations were conducted “under the 
leadership of, and through a sales force of account officers and brokers 
employed by, its affiliated corporation, Refco Securities, LLC, (‘RSL’), a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Refco that operated as a U.S.-based broker-
dealer registered with the SEC.”171 
Customer funds were transferred to RCM from accounts at Refco, LLC, 
an FCM that was segregated under the CEA.172 RCM held itself out as an 
unregulated offshore broker, and “RCM Customers’ securities and other 
property deposited in their accounts were not segregated but were 
commingled in a fungible pool. As a result, no particular security or 
securities could be identified as being held for any particular customer.”173 
It was charged in class action lawsuits that RCM had used customer 
funds totaling several hundred million dollars to fund Refco’s operations 
and help conceal the unreported uncollectible receivable loss.174  Charges 
were also made by hedge fund investors, including celebrity investor James 
B. Rogers, that funds were improperly transferred out of Refco, LLC-
segregated accounts to unsegregated accounts at RCM.175 Rogers’s funds 
had some $362 million on deposit with Refco,176 but he was able to recover 
all of those funds through various recovery efforts.177 
The Refco bankruptcy trustee negotiated the return to the Refco 
bankruptcy estate of $263 million of the $312 million that a group of hedge 
funds had withdrawn from RCM two days after Refco announced its 
previously undisclosed account receivable loss.178 Those investors brought 
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litigation seeking damages from Refco’s auditors, lawyers, and other 
professionals, claiming they aided and abetted Refco’s fraud.179 A district 
court denied a motion to dismiss by Refco’s auditors on the aiding and 
abetting claims in that litigation. 180  The court also allowed claims for 
secondary liability brought against Refco’s auditors, lawyers, and 
underwriters to proceed181 but narrowed the duties claimed to be owed by 
those professionals.182 
Various class actions were brought to challenge those transfers, and 
some of that litigation is still pending. In Capital Management Select Fund 
v. Bennett,183 the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims brought 
by hedge funds against Refco’s officers and auditors.184 The court held that 
the RCM customer agreement allowed customer securities to be 
rehypothecated. 185  The court could find no strong inference of scienter 
where the firm used customer funds and securities to fund its trading 
operations.186 
The Refco failure raised few concerns with the CFTC’s segregation 
requirements because they worked remarkably well in protecting customer 
funds and securities. The transfer of customer positions to MF Global also 
went smoothly. 187  That being said, those customers who removed their 
funds from segregation at Refco, LLC to unregulated accounts at RCM did 
suffer massive losses. 188  Those losses evidenced that all custody and 
safekeeping arrangements do not provide the same protections as those 
available under the CEA. 
B. THE SENTINEL FAILURE 
The failure of Sentinel in August 2007 was one of the first casualties 
stemming from the Financial Crisis, which peaked a few months later.189 
Sentinel was headquartered in Northbrook, Illinois, and was registered with 
the CFTC as an FCM and the SEC as an investment adviser.190 Sentinel’s 
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day-to-day operations involved the management of cash investments for 
proprietary and customer funds of FCMs, hedge funds, financial 
institutions, pension funds, and individuals.191 
The CEA defines an FCM to be an entity that accepts both customer 
orders and funds.192 Sentinel did not execute customer orders and registered 
with the CFTC as an FCM only because this would make it a permissible 
depository of customer funds segregated under the CEA.193 The CFTC gave 
Sentinel special no-action relief that allowed Sentinel to operate without 
meeting the CFTC’s onerous net capital requirements, 194  which were 
deemed unneeded because Sentinel would have no exposure from 
commodity futures or options positions.195 
Sentinel’s selling point was its claim that its investment expertise 
allowed it to produce the highest available returns on customer funds held 
in custody under the CEA.196 FCMs like this approach because it means that 
they do not have to incur the costs of developing their own investment 
expertise, while still receiving high returns from the investment of their 
customer funds. 197  Other money managers also bought into Sentinel’s 
claims of expertise.198 
Sentinel then divided its investment programs into three groups. Its 
“SEG I” accounts were for the funds and properties of customers of other 
FCMs; “SEG II” accounts were for customers of other FCMs trading on 
foreign exchanges; and “SEG III” accounts were for all other clients, 
including proprietary FCM funds and the funds and property of hedge 
funds, trust accounts, endowments, and individuals that invested directly 
with Sentinel rather than through another FCM.199 These groups were then 
subdivided into various trading programs offered by Sentinel.200 
The Bank of New York Mellon (BONY) was the depository used by 
Sentinel for the safekeeping of the customer funds held in the SEG I–III 
accounts.201 BONY signed separate, but virtually identical, letters in which 
it agreed that all of the funds and securities held in the SEG I–III accounts 
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would be segregated in accordance with the provisions of the CEA.202 This 
meant that even the SEG III accounts, which were not otherwise covered by 
the CEA, were required to be held in segregation in the same manner as the 
SEG I accounts under the CEA.203 
Sentinel’s business model proved to be successful after its creation in 
1981. 204  Sentinel took advantage of a decision by the CFTC in 2004 to 
expand the permitted range of investments for customer segregated funds 
that are identified in CFTC Rule 1.25.205 The CFTC then allowed FCMs to 
engage in repurchase agreements (repos) of customer-deposited 
securities.206 That expanded list of permitted investments improved returns 
at Sentinel, but the company also found a way to leverage customer funds 
in a way that had not been envisioned by the CFTC.207 
In its repo transactions, Sentinel typically sold a security it was 
purchasing to a repo dealer with an agreement that Sentinel would buy the 
security back at some specified time in the future.208 The repo dealer kept a 
haircut on the value of the security as collateral to protect itself in the event 
of a decline in the value of the security and a default by Sentinel. 209 
Because Sentinel did not have the resources to fund this haircut, it financed 
the haircut through loans from BONY. 210  For example, if Sentinel 
purchased a $10 million security from Dealer A, it had to pay that amount 
for the security. To acquire those funds, Sentinel did two things. It first 
transferred the security under an agreement to repurchase to either Dealer A 
or another dealer and received back cash in an amount less than $10 million 
because of the haircut.211 
Because Sentinel could not fully fund the purchase of a security through 
a repo transaction, Sentinel then used a loan facility supplied by BONY to 
finance the remaining portion of the purchase price not received from the 
repo counterparty. 212  Customer assets that should have been segregated 
were used to collateralize these loans from BONY to Sentinel. 213 As the 
bankruptcy court later found: 
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As a FCM, and an entity managing other FCM investments, Sentinel was 
required to strictly segregate the investments of its customer groups from 
each other and from Sentinel’s own funds. In fact, however, it d id not 
segregate customer funds. Rather, Sentinel commingled customer funds 
with its own funds and used the customer funds as collateral for its loans 
from [BONY].214 
Sentinel experienced high returns from this program but found itself in 
difficulty when dealers began demanding higher haircuts on the securities 
being repoed by Sentinel and in some cases refusing to deal at all in those 
securities. 215  Sentinel then failed, and BONY seized the SEG I–III 
securities that Sentinel had used to secure its loan with BONY.216  
Sentinel’s Liquidation Trustee sued BONY to recover the customer 
property it had seized.217 The Trustee contended that section 4d(b) of the 
CEA,218 which had been added to the CEA in 1968,219 made the segregation 
provisions of the CEA directly applicable to depository banks such as 
BONY.220 The trustee claimed that BONY breached its duties when it used 
customer segregated securities to secure its loan to Sentinel. 221 However, 
the district court refused to impose such a duty, and the Seventh Circuit 
initially agreed with the district court in In re Sentinel Management Group, 
Inc. 222  The Seventh Circuit held that a depository of CEA customer 
segregated funds need not return funds that were taken out of customer 
accounts and used to secure a loan to the FCM where it was not shown that 
the bank had acted fraudulently. 223  However, the panel rendering that 
decision withdrew it a few months later.224 In August 2013, the Seventh 
Circuit issued a new opinion, which held that the improper transfer of 
customer funds out of segregation evidenced an actual intent to hinder, 
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delay, or defraud creditors. The case was remanded to reconsider the 
liquidation trustee’s claim that the bank should be equitably subordinated to 
the claims of customers.225 
Another issue raised by the Sentinel Liquidation Trustee was the 
priority to be given to the remaining Sentinel assets as between SEG I and 
SEG III customers—there were almost no SEG II customer funds.226 This 
dispute arose after it was discovered that Sentinel had been largely taking 
securities from the SEG I accounts to collateralize the BONY loan.227 
However, only a few weeks before its failure, Sentinel substituted those 
securities for securities taken from the SEG III customer accounts, so that 
when Sentinel failed, it was the SEG III securities that were seized by 
BONY rather than the SEG I securities.228 
The Sentinel Liquidation Trustee sought to have the SEG I and SEG III 
customers share losses from Sentinel on a pro rata basis.229  The Trustee 
contended that those losses should not be borne solely by the SEG III 
customers merely because of Sentinel’s last-minute and arbitrary decision 
to substitute the SEG III for the SEG I securities that Sentinel had 
previously used to fund the BONY loan.230 The Liquidation Trustee also 
argued that equal protection was appropriate because the SEG III customer 
funds were held in custody under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.231 
The Trustee contended that SEC’s IA Custody Rule should be given equal 
status and protection as customer funds held in segregation under the 
CEA.232 This claim gave rise to a battle of the experts over whether the 
segregation requirements of the CEA were more robust than those under the 
IA Custody Rule. Another issue was whether the CEA created a “floating 
trust” that preempted all other trusts.233  The district court ruled that the 
Sentinel customers would share pro rata in the remaining proceeds of the 
estate and that the CEA segregation requirements did not trump the IA 
Custody Rule or create a floating trust.234 
C. LEHMAN BROTHERS 
The failure of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, was the largest 
bankruptcy in U.S. history and resulted in the largest liquidation of a 
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broker-dealer ever.235 About $92 billion in funds and securities were almost 
immediately transferred out of Lehman for the benefit of customers.236 
Customers were allowed to move those funds and their accounts to other 
brokerage firms.237 The bulk of the remaining Lehman Brothers securities 
customers and their assets (about $40 billion) were transferred to Barclays 
Bank, giving rise to “‘the largest, most expedited and probably the most 
dramatic asset sale that has ever occurred in bankruptcy history.’”238 
That sale worked well for most of the accounts transferred. However, 
Barclays refused to take many large accounts totaling several billion 
dollars; those accounts were subject to long delays in resolving their 
treatment and encountered conflicting treatment under bankruptcy laws in 
various countries.239 A dispute also arose over whether the sale to Barclays 
included $769 million in Lehman accounts that were segregated under SEC 
Rule 15c3-3 and $507 million held at the Options Clearing Corp. as 
customer margins. 240 After extended litigation, the district court held that 
those assets should not have been included in the transfer of assets to 
Barclays.241 
Numerous Lehman Brothers customers, including several hedge funds 
and banks, were not paid their funds held at Lehman Brothers, but the 
bankruptcy trustee was able to obtain settlements over the course of several 
years of litigation that allowed the return of virtually all of their funds.242 
For example, the trustee reached a $38 billion settlement over funds held in 
London by a Lehman affiliate and a $6 billion settlement over funds held at 
a Swiss affiliate.243 The Lehman bankruptcy trustee reached a settlement 
late in 2012 with Citigroup Inc., which required that bank to return $435 
million of a disputed $1 billion in funds that it held in connection with the 
clearing of foreign exchange trades for Lehman’s broker-dealer affiliate.244 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (JPMorgan) also became ensnarled in 
litigation over its role as custodian of customer plans segregated under the 
CEA. In In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., the CFTC found by consent 
that respondent had improperly delayed the return of segregated funds of 
Lehman Brothers’ customers.245 The CFTC further charged that JPMorgan 
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had been making improper loans to Lehman based on those segregated 
funds. 246  JPMorgan thereafter entered into a settlement with Lehman’s 
liquidators in which the bank agreed to pay $100 million in settlement of 
claims by the estate against that bank.247 
Otherwise, customer positions and funds segregated at Lehman 
Brothers under the provisions of the CEA and CFTC rules went smoothly 
and were transferred out over a five-day period. 248  However, customer 
segregated assets that were subject to U.K. customer rules were not able to 
be transferred and remained tied up in lengthy litigation in the United 
Kingdom for several years.249 The U.K. Supreme Court eventually held that 
customer funds that were supposed to have been segregated under U.K. 
Financial Services Authority rules would be treated as being segregated 
even if the firm did not actually segregate the funds.250 A settlement was 
also reached that provided for the return of all U.S. customer funds.251 The 
new U.K. Financial Conduct Authority has proposed rules that will allow 
the prompt return of customer funds when a financial services firm fails.252 
Hopefully, this will avoid a repeat of the Lehman debacle. 
D. BERNIE MADOFF 
On December 10, 2008, the sons of Bernie Madoff reported to 
authorities that their father had confessed to them that he had been running 
the largest Ponzi scheme in history. 253 Madoff was a well-known figure in 
the securities industry and had been innovative in introducing electronic 
trading to the securities markets.254  Madoff operated a securities broker-
dealer, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (BLMIS). 
                                                                                                                 
 246.  See id.  
 247.  Ben Protess, With JPMorgan Settlement, MF Global Clients Move Closer to Payout, N.Y. 
T IMES DEALBOOK (Mar. 20, 2013, 9:37 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/20/with-
jpmorgan-settlement-mf-global-clients-move-closer-to-payout/. 
 248.  See Ronald H. Filler, Consumer Protection: How U.K. Client Money Rules Differ from 
U.S. Customer Segregated Rules When a Custodian Firm Fails to Treat Customer Property 
Properly, 24 J. T AX’N & REG. FIN. INSTITUTIONS 25 (2011). 
 249. See id.  
 250. In re Lehman Bros. Int’l (Eur.) (In Admin.) & In re Insolvency Act 1986, [2012] UKSC 6 
(appeal taken from Eng.), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/UKSC_2010_0194 
_Judgment.pdf. 
 251. See James W. Giddens, How to Avoid the Next MF Global Surprise, WALL ST. J., July 10, 
2013, at A11, available at http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10001424127887324766604578458624010464206.html. 
 252. Lindsay Fortado, U.K. Seeks to Tighten Client-Money Rules After Lehman, MF, 
BLOOMBERG (July 12, 2013, 8:07 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-12/u-k-seeks-
to-tighten-client-money-rules-after-lehman-mf.html. 
 253. See HENRIQUES, supra note 4 (describing Madoff’s background and fraud). 
 254. MARKHAM, supra note 235, at 609–13.    
118 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 8 
“Outwardly, BLMIS functioned both as an investment advisor to its 
customers and a custodian of their securities.”255 
Madoff was able to attract billions of dollars in investor funds through 
claims of high returns from his so-called “split-strike conversion 
strategy.” 256  In reality, there was no such strategy. Madoff failed to 
segregate customer funds in accordance with either the SEC Customer 
Protection Rule for broker-dealer customers or the SEC IA Custody Rule 
for investment adviser customers. 257  Profits were also fabricated and 
redemption requests were paid out of other customers’ funds until the whole 
scheme came apart during the Financial Crisis in 2008.258 Madoff’s failure 
gave rise to over 15,000 customer claims totaling over $68 billion.259 Actual 
out-of-pocket losses were eventually determined to total over $17 billion, 
and as of November 15, 2013, the SIPC trustee has recovered a little over 
one-half that amount through various recovery actions.260 That amount also 
included a $708 million commitment from SIPC for its insurance 
coverage.261 
After Madoff’s fraud was exposed, SIPC sought the appointment of a 
trustee to liquidate BLMIS.262 That touched off a lengthy fight over how 
customer claims for SIPC insurance would be computed. 263  The SIPA 
trustee used the “Net Investment Method,” which computed customer 
account balances by crediting the amount of cash deposited by the customer 
and debiting the amounts withdrawn by the customer.264  Customers who 
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withdrew more than they deposited would have no claim for SIPC 
insurance. 265  The issue of whether funds could be clawed back from 
investors who were paid out more than they invested in their accounts at 
BLMIS was also the subject of litigation.266 
E. SIR R. ALLEN STANFORD AND OTHER PONZI SCHEMES 
Another shoe dropped on February 17, 2009, when the SEC charged 
that Sir R. Allen Stanford had been running a giant $7 billion Ponzi scheme 
out of the Caribbean island of Antigua, where he had been knighted.267 
Stanford was charged with and convicted of a criminal fraud involving 
approximately 30,000 investors in 113 countries through fraudulent high-
return certificates of deposit (CDs) issued by the Stanford International 
Bank of Antigua.268 This fraud was the second largest in history, trailing 
only Bernie Madoff in size.269 
The SEC and SIPC found themselves embroiled in a fight over whether 
SIPC was required to insure customers suffering losses from those CDs.270 
A federal district court judge rejected the SEC’s effort to force SIPC to 
commence proceedings to liquidate the Stanford operations and provide 
insurance coverage to victims.271 Stanford owned a Houston-based broker-
dealer that was registered with the SEC, but the Antigua bank, which issued 
the CDs, was not so registered.272 The district court held that the victims of 
Stanford’s fraud were not customers of a broker-dealer, even though the 
CDs were sold through Stanford’s registered broker-dealer in Houston, 
which was a member of SIPC.273 The Court held that the broker-dealer was 
not performing a custodial function in selling the CDs. Rather, customers 
made checks directly payable to the Stanford bank and their CDs were not 
held at the broker-dealer.274 
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The Madoff and Stanford fraud schemes were preceded and succeeded 
by a number of Ponzi schemes in which customer funds were 
misappropriated. To name just a few, Kenneth Kasarjian raised over $800 
million in a Ponzi scheme; J.T. Wallenbrock & Associates raised over $230 
million in a Ponzi scheme; the Reed Slatkin Investment Club Ponzi scheme 
took in over $600 million; and Kevin Leigh Lawrence raised $90 million in 
his Ponzi scheme.275 The Manhattan Investment Fund in Florida defrauded 
investors of $350 million; the Maricopa Index Hedge Fund raised $120 
million through a Ponzi scheme; and the KL Group turned out to be a $200 
million Ponzi scheme. 276  In 2005, the Bayou Hedge Fund Group was 
unmasked as a classic Ponzi scheme that cost investors some $200 
million. 277  Danny Pang’s Ponzi scheme involved some $700 million in 
investor funds. 278  The CFTC has also brought numerous cases in recent 
years against commodity pool operators who were engaged in Ponzi 
schemes.279 
F. MF GLOBAL’S FAILURE 
MF Global and its fifty affiliated entities failed on October 31, 2011.280 
That firm was headed by Jon S. Corzine, the former governor and U.S. 
Senator from New Jersey and a former leader of Goldman Sachs.281 Corzine 
had tried to shore up MF Global’s declining profits by investing in 
European government debt in Greece and other faltering euro zone 
countries on the theory that the European Union would bail them out at 100 
cents on the dollar.282 MF Global’s $6 billion plus bet on that debt resulted 
in large losses and a ratings downgrade that caused a decrease in the firm’s 
liquidity.283 A takeover of MF Global by Interactive Brokers Group Inc. fell 
through after a massive amount of customer funds could not be located.284 
MF Global’s failure was the eighth-largest bankruptcy in the United 
States and the largest failure of a financial services firm since Lehman 
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Brothers.285 There was also a massive shortfall in customer funds totaling 
some $1.6 billion. 286  This included about $900 million of customer 
segregated funds in commodity and securities accounts and $700 million in 
funds that were subject to CFTC Rule 30.7, i.e., customers of MF Global’s 
CFTC-regulated futures commission merchant who were trading on foreign 
exchanges.287 As described above, under Rule 30.7, only a limited amount 
of their funds were required to be held in a Secured Amount account and 
were not required as excess margin funds for trading on regulated U.S. 
commodity option and futures exchanges.288 
An SIPC trustee was appointed for MF Global, Inc. (MFGI), a dually 
registered broker-dealer and futures commission merchant. 289  Other MF 
Global units were subject to liquidation by other trustees, and their claims 
over remaining customer funds were conflicting and led to disputes in the 
United States and in London.290 MFGI asserted customer claims of some 
$910 million against MF Global UK.291 Customer funds that were held in 
MF Global UK were claimed by the London trustee to be unprotected 
funds, which meant they would be treated as general creditors only.292 
However, the U.S. trustee was able to reach an agreement that allowed the 
return of roughly $500 million at issue in the London proceeding for the 
benefit of the Rule 30.7 customers.293  Before that settlement, the SIPC 
trustee had returned eighty percent of customer funds that were segregated 
under section 4d of the CEA, but only five percent of Rule 30.7 funds had 
been returned.294 Nevertheless, the MF Global bankruptcy trustee predicted 
that these customers would eventually be made whole.295 The SIPC trustee 
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also predicted that the customers covered by SIPC insurance could be made 
whole.296   
The CFTC filed a civil injunctive action against Jon Corzine and a 
former Assistant Treasurer of MF Global. 297 Corzine was charged with a 
failure to supervise and with controlling person liability. 298 MF Global was 
also sued and agreed to settle the CFTC’s charges, including 100% 
restitution of all remaining commodity customer claims, assuming there 
were any assets available for return.299 “The proposed order also include[d] 
the imposition of a $100 million penalty, which [could] be paid to the 
extent MF Global ha[d] not fully exhausted all available funds and assets 
paying customers and then other creditors entitled to priority under 
bankruptcy law.”300 
G. PEREGRINE FINANCIAL GROUP AND OTHER SEGREGATION 
FAILURES 
Another large shortfall in customer funds occurred in the failure of 
Peregrine, an Iowa firm that declared bankruptcy on July 10, 2012.301 It was 
discovered that over $200 million in customer funds that were supposed to 
be segregated under the CEA had been misappropriated by the owner of 
that firm: Russell Wasendorf, Sr.302 That conversion occurred over a period 
of some twenty years. 303  There were over 17,000 customer accounts 
affected by this fraud.304 
Purportedly, Wasendorf had submitted false bank statements to 
regulators showing that the customer funds were properly segregated.305 A 
CFTC complaint charged that “in July 2012 during an NFA examination 
PFG falsely represented that it held in excess of $220 million of customer 
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funds when in fact it held approximately $5.1 million.”306 Wasendorf, age 
64, pleaded guilty to criminal charges and was sentenced to fifty years in 
prison.307 
The CFTC filed a civil injunctive action against U.S. Bank, N.A., the 
depository of Peregrine’s segregated funds.308 The CFTC charged that the 
bank had used customer segregated funds as collateral for personal loans to 
Wasendorf and his wife. 309  The CFTC further charged that the bank 
allowed Peregrine to treat its customer segregated funds as being held in a 
commercial bank account that was used to pay for Wasendorf’s personal 
expenses, including an airplane, a restaurant, and a divorce settlement.310 
Customer funds were also used to fund construction of Peregrine’s 
offices.311 
In a separate matter, Farr Financial Inc., the CFTC found by consent 
that the respondent had invested customer funds in securities not authorized 
by CFTC Rule 1.25. 312 These investments included a money market mutual 
fund from which funds could not be withdrawn by the next business day; 
five savings or money market deposit accounts that were not permitted 
investments; and a certificate of deposit whose issuer did not meet the then-
existing credit rating requirement of Rule 1.25.313 In another case, Cantor 
Fitzgerald & Co.,314 the CFTC found by consent that the respondent had 
failed to maintain adequate funds in segregation when it inadvertently 
transferred $3 million from customer-segregated funds to a house 
account. 315  This under-segregation was only belatedly reported, and a 
failure to supervise was found.316 In ABN AMRO Clearing Chicago LLC, 
the CFTC found by consent that the respondent failed to segregate or secure 
customer funds, meet net capital and bookkeeping requirements, and 
supervise its employees. 317  In CFTC v. MBF Clearing Corp., a district 
court by consent found that the defendant had placed customer funds that 
were not properly segregated in an account at an institution. 318 
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V. REGULATORS ACT TO IMPROVE SEGREGATION 
Following the Sentinel and other failures, the CFTC and the industry 
began working on proposals to prevent such events in the future. In 
December 2011, the CFTC amended Rule 1.25 to remove from the list of 
permitted investments for customer segregated funds corporate debt 
obligations not guaranteed by the United States; foreign sovereign debt; and 
in-house and affiliate transactions.319 The CFTC also changed its rules to 
require that FCMs collect margins on a “gross” basis.320 This means that 
FCMs cannot merely transmit the “net” amount of customer margins owed 
to a clearinghouse after offsetting short and long positions of clearing firm 
customers. That requirement had been considered by the National Futures 
Association (the NFA) in 1986 after a series of failures at FCMs raised 
concerns over losses of customer funds.321 As that study found, however, 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (the CME) and some of the other 
exchanges had already imposed such a requirement.322 Presently, the CME 
is dominating futures trading in the United States.323 
The CFTC still allows swap customer funds to be commingled, but 
those funds must now be treated as individual accounts and protected 
individually “all the way to the clearinghouse.”324 This is a change from the 
preexisting regime for customer funds segregated for trading commodity 
futures. “Under the traditional futures margining model, [derivatives 
clearing organizations] hold an FCM’s customer funds on a collective basis 
and are permitted to use the collective margin funds held for the FCM’s 
customers to satisfy a margin deficiency caused by a single customer.”325 
This change underscored a flaw that has troubled the industry in the past, 
i.e., the failure of a customer to meet a margin call will result in a loss to 
other customer funds held collectively in segregation if the FCM does not 
have the assets to cover the loss.326 
Another reform the CFTC imposed was heightened risk management 
and other responsibilities on SROs, including a requirement that they 
increase their access to FCM segregation records.327 The National Futures 
Association (the NFA) had already acted to require that FCMs no longer 
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use the alternative method in computing the Secured Amount under Rule 
30.7. 328  Instead, they were required to use the Net Liquidating Equity 
Method that is required for domestic futures accounts.329 The CFTC also 
proposed such a requirement. 330  It would also eliminate the alternative 
method for computation of the Secured Amount under Rule 30.7.331 
The NFA now requires FCMs to create a targeted amount of excess 
funds held by the FCM as a cushion to assure that segregation is not 
breached by a customer default.332 This was already a common practice by 
many FCMs. Restrictions were also placed on withdrawals by the FCM 
from segregated accounts that are not for the benefit of customers and are in 
excess of twenty-five percent of the FCM’s excess funds held in 
segregation. 333 
The NFA further required FCMs to provide their Designated Self-
Regulatory Organization with view-only access through the Internet to 
account information for each of the FCM’s customer segregated funds and 
Secured Amount accounts held at a bank or trust company depository.334 
The NFA planned to use such reports to conduct a daily comparison of what 
the FCM was reporting as being required to be segregated and the amount 
actually segregated. 335  The NFA and Chicago Mercantile Group, the 
industry’s other principal SRO, were working to develop a computerized 
system for monitoring segregation compliance.336 
The CFTC has further proposed revisions to its FCM reporting 
requirements for net capital and segregation compliance.337 It also proposed 
to add to its own rules a requirement like that of the NFA, which mandates 
that FCMs set a targeted amount of FCM excess funds to serve as a cushion 
for customer defaults or withdrawals. 338  The CFTC further proposed a 
requirement that FCMs establish a risk management program to manage its 
risks and that a risk management unit independent of the business unit be 
established to monitor the program.339 
The CFTC proposed other restrictions, including a mandate of 
“moment-to-moment” segregation, which means that FCMs could not use 
customer segregated funds in their operations or to cover a margin call of a 
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customer between daily segregation calculations.340 Rather, the FCM would 
have to post its own funds to cover margin deficiencies until the customer 
meets a margin call.341 The head of the CME, however, has complained that 
FCMs do not have the appropriate systems to make moment-to-moment 
calculations. 342  Rather, margin calls are usually issued and collected 
overnight. 343 Further, most FCMs do not have the capital to cover every 
momentary deficit in customer accounts, and they do not wish to incur the 
expense.344 
The CFTC proposals would prohibit the FCM from withdrawing its 
excess funds held in segregation until a calculation of its segregation 
requirement is made. 345  The proposals would also adopt the NFA 
requirement restricting withdrawals for the FCM’s own purposes of more 
than twenty-five percent of the FCM’s excess funds held in segregation.346 
The CFTC proposals would confirm that FCMs were liable for any losses 
on investments of customer segregated funds that are made under CFTC 
Rule 1.25.347  
VI. INSURANCE AND OTHER PROPOSALS FOR COMMODITY 
ACCOUNT CUSTODIANS 
Segregation requirements under the CEA are critical to customer 
protection in the commodity futures industry because there is no insurance, 
such as that available for securities customers under SIPC.348 There is thus a 
disparity of treatment between commodity traders and securities customers, 
who enjoy the protection of the SEC Customer Protection Rule and are also 
protected by SIPC insurance.349 There is some history behind that disparity. 
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Included in the legislation that created the CFTC in 1975 was a 
provision that required the CFTC to determine whether account insurance 
was needed for commodity futures customers, such as that provided to 
securities customers under SIPA.350 The CFTC conducted a study on this 
issue and issued a report in 1976, which examined the failures of FCMs 
between 1938 and 1974.351 The CFTC report compared losses to customers 
in government-sponsored insurance programs with loss ratios for 
commodity futures accounts. 352  The CFTC found that loss ratios in 
uninsured commodity futures accounts were substantially lower than those 
in insured accounts.353  The CFTC also concluded that the loss rate for 
customers of FCMs was so low that government account insurance would 
not be cost-effective.354 
As described above, the Bankruptcy Act was amended in 1978 to 
provide customers more protection in the event of their FCM’s failure.355 
That legislation was followed by the failure of some FCMs, which raised 
concerns over the efficacy of the CFTC’s segregation requirements. Those 
failures included Incomco, Inc.; Chicago Discount Commodity Brokers 
Inc.; and Volume Investors, Inc.356 Those failures again raised concerns as 
to whether account insurance was needed for commodity futures customers 
and resulted in a recommendation by the CFTC staff that further study be 
given to whether account insurance was needed for commodity futures 
accounts.357 
In 1985, the CFTC staff found that failures by FCMs had increased 
since the CFTC’s prior report on account insurance.358 Twenty-four FCMs 
failed during that period with losses averaging $2 million annually. 359 
Nevertheless, the estimated losses from FCM bankruptcies between 1938 
and 1985 amounted to less than $10 million, and no action was taken by the 
CFTC to seek additional legislation for account insurance.360 
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The massive failures that occurred in this century again raised concerns 
over whether account insurance was needed for commodity accounts. The 
NFA and other industry groups agreed to conduct a study of the costs and 
benefits of creating an insurance game for commodity futures investors 
comparable to that available for securities investors.361 
The call for account insurance must necessarily clash with concerns 
over the introduction of more moral hazards into the financial system. FDIC 
and SIPC insurance pose the threat that customers depositing their funds at 
an insured institution will no longer monitor the finances of the depository 
in order to protect their assets. There is no need for such vigilance if the 
customer is insured. Instead, regulators will assume the role of monitor and 
adopt more costly regulations that the regulator believes will better allow it 
to monitor the financial condition of insured funds—a process that, as 
described above, is already underway.362 
Another cost issue is the funding of the insurance scheme. That can be 
done by assessments, as is the case for FDIC and SIPC insurance, but 
someone will have to bear that cost. Undoubtedly, that someone will 
ultimately be the consumer. There will also be, undoubtedly, calls for 
greater assessments on larger financial institutions than those for small 
operations, as has been the case at the FDIC.363 
Other proposals include the creation of customer guaranty funds. This 
proposal is an extension of the current guarantee funds that have been 
created by clearinghouses to provide a backstop in the event a clearing firm 
fails. These funds are built up over time through transaction fees, and 
clearinghouses may also have the power to assess non-defaulting clearing 
firms additional amounts to cover losses. The CME Group had about $3 
billion in its largest guaranty fund and authority to assess an additional $8.1 
billion at year-end 2011.364 Presumably, a customer guaranty fund would 
operate in much the same manner but would be in addition to the 
clearinghouse funds. 
What is unanswered is whether the customer guaranty fund would be 
firm-specific or industry-wide. It would, in any event, probably be financed 
through transaction fees paid by customers as they trade. Such fees, if paid 
to a firm-specific customer guaranty fund, would drive high frequency 
traders, who are now responsible for a majority of futures transactions, to 
firms that do not charge such fees. That problem could be solved by 
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mandating such fees and placing them in an industry-wide fund, but that 
would only drive high-frequency traders offshore. 
Another proposal would seek to protect customer funds through tri-
party custodial accounts. Section 4d of the CEA creates a bilateral custodian 
arrangement between the FCM and the bank depository.365 Presumably, a 
tri-lateral arrangement would require reporting by the bank to the FCM’s 
customers, telling them how much is held in custody for their account at the 
bank. This would require that the bank be given access to the customer 
directly, and the bank would have to be told by the FCM what amounts are 
to be held in custody for each account. In years past, that would have been a 
costly task, especially for large FCMs, which may carry over 100,000 
accounts.366 Computerization of records now makes such a process more 
doable. 
Still another proposal concerns the creation of central customer fund 
repositories. This would replicate in some manner the process used by the 
Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) for maintaining 
custody of securities beneficially owned by customers of SEC-regulated 
broker-dealers. That entity was created after the so-called “paperwork 
crisis” that occurred at the end of the 1960s and was the result of the 
requirement to exchange a paper security whenever a security was bought 
and sold. 367 At that time, the brokerage community was not automated and 
could not keep up with the paper flow.368 
The DTCC was created to avoid paperwork by allowing “street name” 
securities, i.e., securities beneficially owned by a customer but held in the 
name of the customer’s broker-dealer, to be maintained in a central 
depository so that the paperwork involved in issuing a paper certificate 
could be eliminated.369 Centralization also provided more security, whereas 
before the creation of a central depository theft of securities was endemic to 
the securities industry. 370  Clearing services, i.e., payment and delivery 
functions, were also centralized through the DTCC.371 
The futures industry has long used central clearinghouses that clear and 
carry all customer trades.372  Those clearinghouses also hold in custody 
customer margin funds required by the exchanges to secure customer 
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trades.373  However, the clearinghouse does not hold in custody excess 
customer margin funds that are not needed at the clearinghouse level to 
secure trades.374 Those excess funds are required to be segregated under the 
CEA and have been the source of the losses from the FCM failures 
described above.375 
Current proposals would expand the role of the clearinghouse to include 
maintaining custody of excess customer funds, as well as those required for 
exchange margins.376 This proposal poses a threat to the revenues of FCMs, 
which are currently allowed to keep the interest earned on permitted 
investments for customer segregated funds. 377  Removing customer 
segregated funds and securities from the control of the FCM to the 
clearinghouses would threaten that revenue stream. To be effective such an 
arrangement would also require that the clearinghouse act as a tri-party 
custodian. Centralization of custody arrangements also increases the risk of 
systemic failure should a clearinghouse fail.378 
One troubling problem that arose in the Lehman Brothers and MF Global 
bankruptcies was the disputes between U.S. and English authorities over 
customer funds held in London. 379  The Bank of England subsequently 
agreed to defer to the United States and refrain from seizing London assets 
when a U.S. financial institution fails. 380  The two countries were also 
working on a plan to develop procedures for liquidating cross-border 
financial institutions. 381  James Giddens, the MF Global and Lehman 
Brothers trustee, wrote an op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal advocating 
that customer funds held outside of the United States be subject to the same 
requirements as funds held here and that there should be greater 
coordination among the international regulatory bodies.382 He also argued 
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that company officers should face the risk of personal liability in the event 
that segregation laws are broken.383 
The Ponzi scheme problem remains, but some efforts are being 
undertaken to limit their operation. Many Ponzi schemes have been carried 
out under the guise of hedge fund investments.384  The SEC had tried to 
regulate hedge funds by requiring them to register as investment 
advisors.385 Numerous hedge funds registered with the SEC under that rule 
before it was stricken by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.386 
Many of those hedge funds then deregistered.387 Ironically, however, Bernie 
Madoff, who had registered under that rule, did not resign his registration 
and continued to carry out his Ponzi scheme under SEC and Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) oversight until it collapsed during 
the Financial Crisis.388 This did not discourage Congress from including a 
provision in Dodd-Frank that requires large hedge funds to again register 
with the SEC under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.389 
The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 
issued a report in 2013 that raised concerns with custodial arrangements in 
which customers knowingly or unknowingly waive a statutory trust fund 
protection. 390 That was a matter at issue in litigation arising from the Refco 
failure. 391  IOSCO was also concerned with instances where a broker 
deposits customer funds in a foreign jurisdiction.392 IOSCO recommended 
that custodians be required to obtain explicit written consent for any waiver 
or modification of a custodial arrangement. 393  It also recommended that 
brokers take into account and understand the characteristics of foreign 
custodial arrangements.394 
VII. UNIFYING CUSTODY ARRANGEMENTS FOR SECURITIES 
AND DERIVATIVES 
The reforms presently being proposed in the wake of the MF Global, 
Madoff, and other failures in this century are all piecemeal attempts to 
patch a system that has outlived its usefulness. The securities, asset 
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management, derivatives, and banking custody needs are inextricably 
intertwined with each other and should be regulated uniformly. As it is 
now, bank deposits of customers and customer securities and funds of 
broker-dealers are insured but under different regulatory schemes and in 
different amounts. 395  In contrast, there is no insurance for the assets of 
futures and other CEA-regulated derivatives customers or for those 
managed by an investment advisor.396 Instead, those customers have only 
the protection of SEC and CFTC segregation requirements. 
These differing regulatory schemes for custody of customer assets may 
also result in competition among customer classes where a dually regulated 
entity fails, as was the case in the Sentinel bankruptcy. 397  A uniform 
approach to the protection of customer custody requirements is needed. The 
first step in that process is to correct the flaws in the existing systems. For 
example, there should be a uniform requirement that customer funds and 
assets be kept separate from those of the financial services firm. That rule 
should extend across all asset classes. 
The next requirement should be that customer funds be treated 
individually at all levels, from FCM/broker-dealer/investment advisers to 
the clearinghouse and bank depository. This would mean that, if one 
customer failed to meet a margin call, other customer funds could not be 
used to meet that call even at the clearinghouse level. This would require a 
tri-party custody arrangement to assure its efficacy. Another needed reform 
is third-party reporting to customers. This would involve independent 
reports to customers of the funds or securities held in custody at either a 
clearinghouse or at a bank or other custodian. 
This arrangement will not assure that intra-day blowups will not occur 
that will cause customer losses. Nevertheless, if such losses are caused by a 
shortfall in one customer’s account, funds of other customers will not be 
available to meet that shortage. Where there is a general shortfall from 
fraud or other reasons, a requirement that losses be shared pro rata should 
be adopted. Such pro rata sharing would also be appropriate where other 
statutory trusts are affected by a shortfall, as in the Sentinel case.398 
Of course, these and other reforms will not stop future Ponzi schemes, 
which flourish during boom times and are exposed on economic downturns. 
There is simply no way to stop these frauds except through customer 
vigilance when they are solicited by promises of large repeated gains. Bona 
fide asset managers can make no such claims because they know markets 
are unpredictable. Even a favorable track record over a period of years does 
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not provide assurance that gains will continue. Any asset manager 
suggesting otherwise should be avoided. A good example of this reality was 
Bill Miller’s stewardship of the Legg Mason Value Fund.399 He had made 
returns for that fund that topped the S&P 500 Index’s growth for fifteen 
years in a row.400 However, that streak ended in 2006, and in 2008 investors 
lost fifty-eight percent of their investment.401 The loss in 2008 wiped out all 
past gains and turned Miller’s fund into the worst performing mutual fund 
over the prior ten years.402 
Regulated firms that run off-book operations, like Madoff, that are not 
reported to their regulators can also evade this net by falsifying documents 
sent to customers and regulators. There is little that can be done here except 
to use surprise inspections as a possible deterrent and to look for customer 
complaints that might reveal the off-the-books arrangements.403 
CONCLUSION 
The debacles in recent years that resulted in the tying up and loss of 
customer funds evidence a need for reform. In this era of computers, there 
is no reason why customer funds cannot be tracked on a per-account basis 
at depositories, as well as at the FCM. This would better assure customer 
protection. 
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